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The aesthetics of non-objectivity. From the worker’s two bodies to cultural revolution

Abstract
This article carries out a detailed reading of Marx’s theory of sensual alienation in the Economic and philosophical manuscripts of 1844. Drawing on recent French scholarship arguing that alienation should be grasped as a loss of objectivity (rather than subjectivity), I show that Marx develops a curious aesthetics of non-objectivity. By reading the Economic and philosophical manuscripts in light of later, related arguments in the Grundrisse and Capital, I challenge the widespread notion, primarily associated with Louis Althusser, that the 1844 Manuscripts are guilty of a humanist essentialism. The aesthetics of (non-)objectivity can be seen as a battleground between two opposing corporeal tendencies of the worker under capitalism: the unaccommodated body, shorn of all objectivity, and the (utopian) “totally developed individual” referred to in Capital, vol. 1. Ultimately, I argue that the 1844 Manuscripts contain the rudiments of a theory of aesthetic education which, read through the lens of the Grundrisse and Capital, can be interpreted as an emergent theory of cultural revolution.

Keywords
Aesthetics, Marx, Senses

1. Introduction: the loss of objectivity

Certain theories of alienation are amongst its subtlest symptoms. This is effectively Marx’s argument against Hegel in the Economic and philosophical manuscripts of 1844: Hegel confuses estrangement (Entfremdung) with objectivity as such, seeking its sublation (Aufhebung) in an absolute spiritual internalisation of the object, thereby re-affirming the non-objective, abstract (and hence, for Marx, residually alienated) consciousness he should logically have overcome (Marx 1992: 379-400, henceforth EPM). This confusion of objectivity with estrangement is a clear sign of the very alienation it aims to supersede. This is

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because, for Marx, man is an “objective sensuous being” (EPM: 390), a “natural being” (EPM: 389): “he has real, sensuous objects as the object of his being and of his vital expression”, but these “essential objects” (EPM: 389) lie outside him. It is precisely this basic dependence on external objectivity that makes him an objective being. Objects are essential not only to his basic survival, but to the activation (Betätigung) and confirmation (Bestätigung) of his “essential powers” (Wesenkräfte; EPM: 389-90). It is nature, the “sensuous external world” (EPM: 325), in which man realises his labour, and the realisation of labour is its objectification. The latter results in objects, or products, that constitute activations or confirmations of man’s essential powers. To confuse objectivity and estrangement is thus to deny man’s objective nature.

Under the regime of private property, however, man is separated from the products of his labour: “the object that labour produces, its product, stands opposed to it as something alien, as a power independent of the producer” (EPM: 324). Consequently, under capitalism, “this realization of labour appears as a derealisation (Entwirklichung) of the worker” (EPM: 324, translation modified). Separated from the objectivity on which his objective being depends, “the worker is robbed of the objects he needs most not only for life but also for work” (EPM: 324). The consequence is that labour itself is experienced as an external imposition rather than self-actualisation: “the worker’s own physical and mental energy, his personal life [is experienced] as an activity directed against himself, which is independent of him and does not belong to him” (EPM: 327). These are the conditions under which man’s species-life is reduced to a mere means for his individual life (EPM: 328), and through which he is deprived of his species-objectivity – “his inorganic body, nature” (EPM: 329). It is for these reasons that alienation is not so much a loss of the subject – a diminution of some pre-existing substantial personhood – as a loss of objectivity.

Franck Fischbach has argued convincingly that this loss of objectivity is simultaneously a production of the subject:

for beings who are themselves objective, such as humans, [alienation] consists rather in the loss of their “essential objects”, that is in the loss of their own objectivity [...]. But it is precisely in this loss of objectivity that the becoming-subject of humans (hommes) – that is, the formation of modern subjectivity –

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2 In translating Betätigung as “activation” rather than “exercise” as in EPM I follow Fischbach 2014 and 2016.
essentially consists: subjectivity befalls the being from whom every objective dimension of her existence has been withdrawn, from whom all essential and vital objects (those on which she depends to persevere in being) have been subtracted. Alienation is thus not the loss of the subject in the object, but the “loss of the object” for a being who is herself objective. (Fischbach 2014: 20-1)

It is this idea of subjectivity as the positive form of non-objectivity on which I shall initially focus in what follows. In particular, I shall draw on selected passages of the Grundrisse to frame a detailed reading of Marx’s theory of the senses in the Economic and philosophical manuscripts. In doing so, I hope (indirectly) to challenge the widespread notion, primarily associated with Louis Althusser, that the 1844 Manuscripts are guilty of a humanist essentialism that presupposes “a definite pre-existing [human] essence” (Althusser 2005: 226). For on this reading Marx’s well-known comments on the socialisation of the human sensorium would have to be interpreted as a call for the restoration of some Edenic sensual integrity that has existed in potentia throughout history (in other words, they can be written off as youthful idealism). As opposed to this, I hope to show that the Paris Manuscripts, read in light of Marx’s later work, hint at something far stranger: an aesthetics of (non-)objectivity which, following clues in the Grundrisse, can be seen as a battleground between two opposing corporeal tendencies of the worker under capitalism: the unaccommodated body, shorn of all objectivity, and the “totally developed individual” (Marx 1976: 618, henceforth C). Ultimately, I shall argue that the 1844 Manuscripts contain the rudiments of a theory of aesthetic education which, read through the lens of the Grundrisse and Capital, can be interpreted as an emergent theory of cultural revolution.

2. The worker’s two bodies

“Aesthetics is born”, writes Terry Eagleton, “as a discourse of the body” (1990: 13). But of which body exactly? It is well-known that Hegel begins his Phenomenology of spirit by revealing sense-certainty, that

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3 I am not alone in this undertaking. Even where I have not always drawn on it directly in this article, I am indebted to the following scholarship: Monferrand 2016, Renault 2008, and Fischbach 2014 and 2016. I am grateful to Frédéric Monferrand for sharing his (as yet) unpublished doctoral thesis.
seemingly most trustworthy and concrete configuration of consciousness, firmly embedded in the immediacy of the empirical body, to be the most abstract and least truthful of all. Less widely recognized is Marx’s version of this argument. In key passages of the *Grundrisse*, those which not coincidentally return to the themes of the *1844 Manuscripts*, Marx reformulates his theory of alienation with renewed theoretical clarity. He holds that the precondition of exchange between capital and labour is the prior “separation of property from labour” (Marx 1973: 295, henceforth G). Since labour is opposed to capital, it is posited as “not-capital as such”, which is another way of saying “not-objectified labour (nicht-vergegenständlichte Arbeit)” (G: 295). The latter can be grasped both negatively and positively. Seen negatively, not-objectified labour is “not-raw-material, not-instrument of labour, not-raw product: labour separated from all means and objects of labour, from its entire objectivity” (G: 295). Returning to the tropes of nakedness that recur throughout the *Communist manifesto*, Marx describes it as the “complete denudation, purely subjective existence of labour, stripped of all objectivity. Labour as absolute poverty: [...] the total exclusion of objective wealth” (G: 296). This is the logical extreme of alienation and the telos of primitive accumulation.

Paradoxically, however, and still viewed negatively, non-objectified labour *does* in fact exist in an objective form: a “purely objective use value, existing without mediation, this objectivity can only be an objectivity not separated from the person: only an objectivity coinciding with his immediate bodily existence” (G: 296, emphases added). It is thus the body which is “the non-objective itself in objective form” (G: 295), the *living formalization of a deprivation*: the fleshy, objective form of de-objectified labour. What Shakespeare, in *King Lear*, calls “unaccommodated man” – “the naked truth [...] a man is forced to face when he has lost everything that other men can take away, except life itself” (Berman 1982: 107) – and was, for Shakespeare, a figure of the deepest tragedy, is that which capital posits as its basic presupposition. Yet in both Shakespeare and Marx, this “poor, bare, forked animal” (*King Lear*, III. iv) is the outcome of a process: for Shakespeare, a whole tragic action, for Marx “a world’s history” (C: 274). Indeed, one must read the

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4 I plan to write elsewhere about the relation of de-objectification to the “person” mentioned in the previous quotation; suffice it to say that the role of the “person” complicates the picture presented in this article to the extent that it introduces the state as mediator between the worker’s two bodies.
famous sentence, “[t]he cultivation (Bildung) of the five senses is the work of all previous history” (EPM: 353), in light of the correlative claim in Capital that capitalism “arises only when the owner of the means of production and subsistence finds the free worker available, on the market, as the seller of his own labour-power. And this one historical pre-condition comprises a world’s history” (C: 274). Viewed negatively, the five senses are first and foremost five unique appropriations of non-objectivity (a point to which I shall return); the unaccommodated body, seemingly as concrete and immediate as sense-certainty, is revealed to be the living materiality of abstraction.

Remarkably, however, Marx insists that not-objectified labour – “absolute poverty” – can also be conceived positively, “or as a negativity in relation to itself” (G: 296): “Labour not as object, but as activity; not as itself value, but the living source of value […] as the general possibility of [wealth]” (G: 296). Absolute poverty, viewed positively, is pure subjective potentiality, indifferent to the particular forms of labour through which it is actualised: it is “labour pure and simple, abstract labour; absolutely indifferent to its particular determination (Bestimmtheit), but capable of all determinations” (G: 296, translation modified). Living labour is thus the flipside of capital’s indifference to every particularity of its substance. Jason Read has connected it back to the notion of species-being (Gattungswesen) in the 1844 Manuscripts: “Abstract labor, the capacity for any-labor whatsoever as opposed to the determinate fixed activity, appears here in a manner akin to species-being with the exception that rather than appearing prior to capital, as a lost presupposition, it appears internal to it as both effect and necessary cause” (Read 2003: 80). In a text as dialectically sophisticated as the Grundrisse, in which the dialectical unity of the positive and negative valences of each phenomenon are so carefully delineated, there occurs a notable lacuna at this point in Marx’s argument; he provides no positive inversion of the objective form of non-objectivity. In other words, if the unaccommodated body is the negative objective form of non-objectivity, what is its positive form? The answer, I shall suggest, is what Marx in volume 1 of Capital calls “the totally developed individual” (das total entwickelte Individuum; C: 618). One might then argue that the unaccommodated body and the “totally developed individual” are the opposing corporeal tendencies of the worker under capitalism. The former is the corporeal figure of capital’s self-valorisation, the latter the emergent body of living labour’s own.
3. The aesthetics of (non-)objectivity

To grasp the aesthetic dynamics in which the antagonistic “totally developed individual” is involved, it is useful to remind ourselves of Marx’s Schillerian inheritance. I have written elsewhere of the elective affinities between a radical line of argumentation in Schiller’s letters on aesthetic education and Marx’s early writings on Prussian press censorship and wood theft (Hartley 2017a). Without rehearsing that argument in full here, suffice it to say that Schiller’s ideal state is one which “creates [or forms/educates—(bildet)] itself through itself for itself” and “observes with respect to its citizens the same relationship as each has to himself” (Schiller 2016: 13, translation modified); such collective self-formation avoids the violence of a state authoritarian formalism that would impose unity only by suppressing diversity. Moreover, Schiller notes that “[i]t is only in the sequence of his ideas that the persisting I itself becomes manifested to itself (Nur durch die Folge seiner Vorstellungen wird das beharrliche Ich sich selbst zur Erscheinung)” (Schiller 2016: 47). The ideal state would thus be one in which the “sequence of ideas” through which each person becomes manifested to herself is articulated with the “free association” of ideas that characterises the faculty of imagination: “the individual capacity for joyful, unrestrained concatenation of images and thoughts, as well as collective assemblies of bodies and minds freely exchanging ideas, forms and images with no censorious intervention from an abstract state” (Hartley 2017a: 169). According to this aesthetic logic, human liberation can occur only when the state itself embodies free association and collective self-actualisation. As we shall see, this logic is integral to the self-valorisation of living labour and, by extension, the composition of the “totally developed individual”.

Where Marx, in his earlier articles, drew on this Schillerian logic to criticise the violent abstractions of the bourgeois state, the 1844 Manuscripts extend their logic to a study of the aesthetics of (non-)objectivity. Marx notes that what distinguishes human production from that of animals is that “[animals] produce one-sidedly (einseitig), while man produces universally [...] man is capable of producing according to the standards of every species and of applying to each object its inherent standard; hence man also produces in accordance with the laws of beauty” (EPM: 329). The laws of beauty, then, apply to each object its inherent standard, just as for Schiller the aesthetic state applies an im-
permanent criterion to each citizen; but under capital this *positive* attribute of human production is transformed into its negative: as we have seen, living labour is “absolutely indifferent to its particular determination (*Bestimmtheit*), but capable of all determinations (*jeder Bestimmtheit fähig*)” (G: 296, emphasis added). This must be grasped at the levels of the object and the activity of labour respectively (i.e., the first two types of alienation in the *1844 Manuscripts*). For the object, living labour’s abstract indifference to determination is the result of the sublation of C-M-C, still residually structured according to the means-end logic of *poiēsis*, by the general capitalist formula of M-C-M’, a demonic, autotelic *praxis* that is limitless and inaugurates the reign of capital’s indifference to every particularity of its substance (in political terms: the defeat of the guilds; see C: 252-3 and G: 296-7). At the level of activity, living labour harbours the *abstract potential* for variegated, “all-rounded” post-capitalist self-realisation – hunting in the morning, fishing in the afternoon, criticizing after dinner (Marx and Engels 1970: 53) – but which presently assumes the alienated form of constant unpredictable crises in one branch of industry that force the worker immediately to find employment in a different branch if she is to survive. Given the extreme specialisation and one-sidedness of certain industries, workers often lack even this *potential* (alienated) variability. Nonetheless, Marx reads this devastating precariousness and constant mobility as the negative image of the multiple modes of activity through which the “totally developed individual” will express herself under socialism (see C: 618).

Even the human sensorium, Marx argues, will become more variegated. According to the *1844 Manuscripts* humans appropriate their “all-rounded” (*allseitiges*) being in an all-rounded way (“seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, thinking, contemplating, sensing, wanting, acting, loving”; EPM: 351). Under capitalism, however, sensuous appropriation of the world is reduced to the one-sidedness of immediate possession: “an object is only ours when we have it, when it exists for us as capital or when we directly possess, eat, drink, wear, inhabit it, etc., in short, when we use it” (EPM: 351). Ultimately, all physical and intellectual senses have been replaced by the single sense of *having* (EPM: 352; on the influence of Moses Hess on Marx’s understanding of “having” [*haben*], see Fischbach 2008). The reign of private property will thus end only when one-sided “having” has been sublated by all-rounded appropriation; tellingly, what Marx calls “crude com-
mumism” (EPM: 346) is deemed insufficient because it simply universalises “having” for all (one might think here of looting as a prefiguration of crude communism). The precondition for the actualisation of all-rounded appropriation is the re-objectification of man and the humanisation of objectivity.

How one conceives of this process of sensual re-objectification, and in particular of Marx’s term “essential powers” (Wesenskräfte), will go a long way to determining whether or not the 1844 Manuscripts are seen to indulge in humanist essentialism. Since humans, Marx argues, are objective natural beings, their “essential powers” have a specific relation to objectivity; to be actualised, they must be objectified. Each essential power, which Marx often seems to use interchangeably with “sense”, objectifies and is objectified in a unique way: “The manner in which they [objects] become his [man’s] depends on the nature of the object and the nature of the essential power that corresponds to it; for it is just the determinateness of this relation that constitutes the particular, real mode of affirmation” (EPM: 353). The sensuous appropriation of objects thus consists of two elements: the nature of the object itself and the nature of the “essential power” that “corresponds” to it. Though this is a relation of mutual affection and activation, Marx implies that the power of determination is on the side of the object (“corresponds to it”). The “real mode of affirmation” is constituted by the determinate encounter of the unique composition of the object and that of the “essential power” (e.g., sight, hearing), hence why “[a]n object is different for the eye from what it is for the ear, and the eye’s object is different from the ear’s” (EPM: 353). It is at this point that a curious autonomisation of the “essential powers” begins to occur in Marx’s argument: “The peculiarity of each essential power”, he writes, “is precisely its peculiar essence, and thus also the peculiar mode of its objectification, of its objectively real, living being” (EPM: 353). Whilst “essential powers” are essential to us, their own essence coincides with the “peculiar mode of [their] objectification”; that is, the internal composition of the essential powers varies depending upon the nature of the objects available to them and their mode of objectification. Whilst the fact of their constituting our capacity objectively to realize ourselves remains constant, their variegated internal development shifts
in line with objectivity itself. The singular individual is thus a composition of multiple, discontinuous objectifications of “essential powers” developing in relative autonomy from one another⁵.

In the next paragraph Marx tries to grasp the same problem from the perspective of the subject:

Just as music first awakens the musical sense in man, just as the most beautiful music has no sense, is no object, for the unmusical ear, because my object can only be the confirmation of one of my essential powers, i.e. can only be for me as my essential power (as subjective ability) is for itself, because the sense of an object for me extends only as far as my sense extends (only has sense for a sense that corresponds to that object). (EPM: 353, translation modified)⁶

If “music first awakens the musical sense in man”, it is because essential powers require objectification before they can be activated⁷. Yet the “most beautiful music” has no sense and is not an object for an unmusical ear because an object “can only be the confirmation of one of my essential powers”. Since my ear lacks the essential power of musicality, the most beautiful music cannot be sensuously appropriated. The question then becomes: what is the exact status of such music? According to the logic of Marx’s argument, which holds that “feelings, passions, etc. [...] are truly ontological affirmations of [man’s] essence (nature)” (wahrhaft ontologische Wesens-(Natur-)bejahungen sind; EPM: 375), such music is not for me. I suspect we have to imagine here the auditory experience of someone with no musical training when she first encounters, say, a piece of complex classical music; she will, of course, hear something, and her class instinct will no doubt tell her that this is deemed “good” music (by others – those alien to her), but her sensuous appropriation of the sound will be purely abstract – she can

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⁵ For excellent Spinozist re-articulations of this point, see Fischbach (2014: 42) and Monferrand (2016: 271). The latter writes: “man is not a ‘kingdom within a kingdom’ but a finite mode affected in a great number of ways by other finite modes that he affects in return”.

⁶ The English translation by Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton breaks in two what is a long, unwieldy German sentence structured according to the “Just as [...] so” formula. For the sake of linguistic accuracy, I here reproduce the first half of the original, long-winded structure as well as reinstating a crucial omission: “is no object” (kein Gegenstand ist). The second half of the sentence will be given below.

⁷ As Monferrand notes, “objectivity is not ‘essential’ in the sense in which a being would see her essence reflected in it [as in Feuerbach, D.H.], but in the sense that it is the condition of activation (Betätigung) of the ‘essential powers’ constitutive of this being” (2016: 270).
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neither relate to it nor appreciate the internal complexities of the composition in the same way as, say, a classical practitioner or aficionado. The potential musicality of her ear is experienced in a negative mode as *indifference* to “the most beautiful” music. She senses the music in the modality of loss, as a *non-object*: it echoes into the ether of a world she does not recognize as her own.

Yet this would seem to raise doubts about Marx’s previous argument. Until now, determination was on the side of the object: the internal composition of the object went a long way to determining the “peculiar mode of objectification” of the “essential power”. Now, from the perspective of the subject, it seems that the mere presence of an object is a necessary but insufficient condition for the activation of a corresponding power. Extending the logic of the autonomisation of the essential powers, Marx notes that an object “can only be for me as my essential power (as subjective ability) is for itself”. In other words, my objectivity and sensibility are coextensive with the autonomous (“for itself”, für sich) development of my essential powers as subjective abilities. Yet how do my senses develop themselves? Marx offers a clue in the second half of the sentence that began in the previous long quotation:

in the same way, and for the same reasons, the *senses* of social man are different from those of non-social man. Only through the objectively unfolded wealth of human nature does the wealth of subjective human sensitivity – a musical ear, an eye for the beauty of form, in short, senses capable of human gratification – become in part cultivated, in part created. For not only the five senses, but also the so-called spiritual senses, the practical senses (will, love, etc.), in a word, the human sense, the humanity of the senses – all these come into being only through the existence of their objects, through humanized nature. The *cultivation* of the five senses is the work of all previous history. (EPM: 353, translation modified)

At first sight, this seems to be a simple reiteration of Marx’s previous point concerning the priority of the object in the constitution of the essential power. The difference lies in the ambiguous phrase “in part cultivated, in part created” (teils erst ausgebildet, teils erst erzeugt). The objective unfolding of the wealth of human nature does not unconsciously, automatically generate a non-alienated human sensorium. This would imply a mechanistic, one-sided causality between object and power that Marx expressly tries to avoid in this passage by emphasizing the interrelation of the five senses with the “spiritual” and “practical” senses. Instead, Marx seems to be gesturing towards a vast
process of collective re-objectification that is at the same time something like a collective self-education. It is a process that combines the production of new objects to activate new modalities of man’s essential powers (“in part created”, erzeugt), and a mass education programme capable of raising those powers’ “subjective abilities” to the requisite level necessary for new objects to constitute their objects (“in part cultivated”, ausgebildet)\(^8\).

4. Conclusion: cultural revolution

It is perhaps not too far-fetched to describe this process as cultural revolution. I intend this not in the sense of the Chinese experience, but in the more general sense articulated by Fredric Jameson in *The political unconscious* of a fundamental shift in human sociality and sensoria that occurs in and through every transition between different modes of production\(^9\). For example, he describes the “Western Enlightenment” as a “bourgeois cultural revolution”: “the values and the discourses, the habits and the daily space, of the ancien régime were systematically dismantled so that in their place could be set the new conceptualities, habits and life forms, and value systems of a capitalist market society” (Jameson 1981: 96). Despite being conceived primarily as “transitional” processes, Jameson stresses that cultural revolutions bring to fruition permanent struggles and contradictions characteristic of given social formations. This then allows us to grasp the sheer ambiguity of the “objectively unfolded wealth of human nature” amidst its entanglement with the history of capital. Immediately following Marx’s fulsome descriptions of the “senses of social man” comes the claim that it is only under private property and through the development of industry that man’s essential powers become recognizable as such: like an “open book” (EPM: 354), industry has phenomenallised man’s essential powers (Monferrand 2016: 131). Just as the unaccom-

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8 *Ausgebildet*, the past participle of *ausbilden*, combining the preposition aus (out of, from) with the noun *Bildung* (education, formation), has several meanings: cultivated, trained, educated.

9 In *Valences of the dialectic*, he refers to Lenin’s understanding of cultural revolution as “[t]he process [...] in which the formation of revolutionary subjectivity is transformed into the restructuration of collective subjectivities along the logic of a new mode of production” (Jameson 2009: 267).
modated body is the objective form of non-objectivity, so private property is the “material, sensuous expression of estranged human life” (EPM: 349). The cultivation of new objects and desires is thus not some youthful utopian ideal but partly the work of capital itself: “the discovery, creation and satisfaction of new needs arising from society itself; the cultivation of all the qualities of the social human being, the production of the same in a form as rich as possible in needs, because rich in qualities and relations [...] is likewise a condition of production founded on capital” (G: 409).

Capital stimulates the variegated development of “all the qualities of the social human being” but does so whilst separating the vast majority of the world’s population from their essential objectivity, forcing them to “sense” the riches of the world in the modality of loss: as the unbearable lightness of enforced non-being. Such is capital’s self-valorization and its mass production of the unaccommodated body, whose imperialist integument generates historically variable racisms that compound objective non-being with socio-ontological groundlessness (see Ciccariello-Maher 2012).

On the other hand, living labour performs its own self-valorization through refusal, non-work, by making demands, through what Raymond Williams (1977 and 1981) would call emergent (oppositional and alternative) social practices and relationships. As Monferrand observes, since new objects produce new activations of essential forces, “technical innovation, artistic creation or the institution of cultural forms are [...] always simultaneously the production of forms of subjectivity capable of entirely new uses, reflexive pleasures, and differentiated self-expressions” (2016: 283. For a different account of the capacity, or not, of cultural and literary forms to embody emergent modes of subjectivity, see Hartley 2015 and 2017b). Yet, as we have seen, the production of new objects alone is insufficient; these must be coupled with processes of education that develop the “subjective abilities” of our essential powers. It is no coincidence, for example, that Marx’s reference to the “totally developed individual” (1976: 618) in Capital is flanked by two references to innovations in proletarian education: Robert Owen’s vision of a future education system contained in nuce in the factory system itself (a combination of productive labour with instruction and gymnastics – “the only method of producing fully developed human beings”, says Marx 1976: 614), and the claim that “with the inevitable conquest of political power by the working class, technological education, both theoretical and practical, will take its
proper place in the schools of the workers” (1976: 619). Fredric Jameson has gone so far as to suggest that in these few pages we find “the elements of a whole theory of cultural revolution” (Jameson 2011: 117):

This is truly a changing of the valences of the social system: not only is the terrifying space of imprisonment of industrial wage labor transformed into the crystal palace of human development, but that very division of labor which made industrial workers into cripples and monsters now returns them to the expansive perspectives of “cooperation” and of Marx’s early collective “humanism”. (Jameson 2011: 118)

The opposed self-valorizations of capital (positing the unaccommodated body as its presupposition whilst ever expanding the range and quality of needs across the globe) and living labour (striving for the “totally developed individual” whilst suffering the absolute poverty of non-objectivity) are thus mutually constitutive yet directly opposed: they are the heart of class struggle.

Marx’s 1844 Manuscripts, read in light of the Grundrisse and Capital, thus suggest that aesthetic education might be usefully transcoded as cultural revolution. The latter, viewed from the perspective of the transition from capitalism to post-capitalism, names the process of a collective proletarian self-education and self-constitution: projects here and now to win back objectivity via a combination of the production of new objects, new forms, and new social relations, along with a pedagogical programme designed to develop new subjective capacities that enable the all-rounded sensuous appropriation of such new objects as our own. The “totally developed individual” is the collective corporeal figure intrinsic to this process, a site of joyful, all-rounded encounters and experimentation that increase our capacity to act and think, and at the extreme augment our very social being. Yet this process is ever imbricated with capital’s opposing drive to diminish the collective body to the non-being of unaccommodated man: through violence, discipline, or – more subtly – through incorporation and privatisation of the collective vitality and intellectuality of the working class. It is in all these ways that aesthetic education, transposed into the key of cultural revolution, is intrinsic to class struggle.

Bibliography


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